论文标题
人群增强或扭曲的智慧？社会影响下的基于代理的舆论形成模型
Enhanced or distorted wisdom of crowds? An agent-based model of opinion formation under social influence
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出了一个基于代理的集体意见形成模型，以研究社会影响下人群的智慧。代理人的意见是一种持续的积极价值，表示其对事实问题的主观答案。人群的智慧指出，所有观点的平均值与真理，即正确的答案。但是，如果代理商有机会根据他人的意见来调整他们的意见，那么这种效果就会被破坏。我们的模型通过评估两种竞争效果来调查这种情况：（i）代理人倾向于保持自己的意见（个人定罪$β$），（ii）如果他们对他人的观点有信息（社会影响力$α$），他们倾向于调整自己的意见。对于后者，比较了两种不同的制度（完整信息与汇总信息）。我们的模拟表明，只有在极少数情况下，社会影响才能增强人群的智慧。大多数情况下，我们发现代理人汇聚成一个集体意见，它离真实的答案更远。因此，在社会影响下，人群的智慧在系统上可能是错误的。
We propose an agent-based model of collective opinion formation to study the wisdom of crowds under social influence. The opinion of an agent is a continuous positive value, denoting its subjective answer to a factual question. The wisdom of crowds states that the average of all opinions is close to the truth, i.e. the correct answer. But if agents have the chance to adjust their opinion in response to the opinions of others, this effect can be destroyed. Our model investigates this scenario by evaluating two competing effects: (i) agents tend to keep their own opinion (individual conviction $β$), (ii) they tend to adjust their opinion if they have information about the opinions of others (social influence $α$). For the latter, two different regimes (full information vs. aggregated information) are compared. Our simulations show that social influence only in rare cases enhances the wisdom of crowds. Most often, we find that agents converge to a collective opinion that is even farther away from the true answer. So, under social influence the wisdom of crowds can be systematically wrong.
