论文标题
警惕的饮食规则：一种概率经济设计的一般方法
The Vigilant Eating Rule: A General Approach for Probabilistic Economic Design with Constraints
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑在有序偏好下对物体分配的概率分配问题。我们设计了一种称为警惕饮食规则（VER）的分配机制，该机制适用于几乎任意的可行性约束。它是有效的，可以有效地计算出一大批约束，如果代理具有相同的偏好并受到相同的约束，则可以平等地对待。当可行的分配是凸的集合时，我们还基于序数平均主义的规则表征。我们关于VER的结果不仅适用于分配问题，还适用于所有集体选择问题，在这些问题中，代理在离散结果中具有序数偏好。作为案例研究，我们假设对象具有对代理的优先级，并将VER应用于受稳定性约束的概率分配集。当优先级平坦时，当偏好和优先级严格时，ver与（扩展的）概率序列规则相吻合，而代理提出确定性递延接受算法。虽然VER总是返回稳定且有限的有效分配，但它并没有进行策略性，不受约束和嫉妒。但是，我们表明，这三个属性中的每一个都与稳定性和效率约束不相容。
We consider the problem of probabilistic allocation of objects under ordinal preferences. We devise an allocation mechanism, called the vigilant eating rule (VER), that applies to nearly arbitrary feasibility constraints. It is constrained ordinally efficient, can be computed efficiently for a large class of constraints, and treats agents equally if they have the same preferences and are subject to the same constraints. When the set of feasible allocations is convex, we also present a characterization of our rule based on ordinal egalitarianism. Our results about VER do not just apply to allocation problems but to all collective choice problems in which agents have ordinal preferences over discrete outcomes. As a case study, we assume objects have priorities for agents and apply VER to sets of probabilistic allocations that are constrained by stability. VER coincides with the (extended) probabilistic serial rule when priorities are flat and the agent proposing deterministic deferred acceptance algorithm when preferences and priorities are strict. While VER always returns a stable and constrained efficient allocation, it fails to be strategyproof, unconstrained efficient, and envy-free. We show, however, that each of these three properties is incompatible with stability and constrained efficiency.
