论文标题
在零和游戏中竞争说服力
Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究贝叶斯的说服力，这些发件人可以访问有条件独立的实验（甚至其他）。发件人比显示的信息具有零和偏好。我们表征了何时可以以平衡汇总任何一组状态，以及所有平衡何时完全揭示。当且仅当发送者实用程序函数是“全球非线性”时，状态在每个均衡中都得到了充分揭示。对于两个状态，这等同于某些具有非平凡偏好的发件人。结果是“大多数”零和零件的偏好会导致完整的启示。我们探索哪些条件对于竞争很重要，从而导致这种鲜明的信息启示。
We study Bayesian Persuasion with multiple senders who have access to conditionally independent experiments (and possibly others). Senders have zero-sum preferences over information revealed. We characterize when any set of states can be pooled in equilibrium and when all equilibria are fully revealing. The state is fully revealed in every equilibrium if and only if sender utility functions are `globally nonlinear'. With two states, this is equivalent to some sender having nontrivial preferences. The upshot is that `most' zero-sum sender preferences result in full revelation. We explore what conditions are important for competition to result in such stark information revelation.
