论文标题
独立私人价值拍卖的分配上有稳定的定价
Distributionally Robust Pricing in Independent Private Value Auctions
论文作者
论文摘要
当卖方仅知道价值分配的平均值和上限本身或差异时，卖方选择了第二价拍卖中的储备价，以最大程度地提高最差的预期收入。价值观是私人和IID。使用间接技术，我们证明将储备金设置为卖方自己的估值始终是最佳的。但是，Maxmin储备价格可能不是唯一的。如果投标人的数量足够高，则包括零（零）低于卖方的所有价格也是最佳的。随着投标人的数量增长而没有界限，与储备的第二价格拍卖相当于卖方的价值（或零）（零）是一种最佳的最佳机制（在所有事后单独理性机制中）。
A seller chooses a reserve price in a second-price auction to maximize worst-case expected revenue when she knows only the mean of value distribution and an upper bound on either values themselves or variance. Values are private and iid. Using an indirect technique, we prove that it is always optimal to set the reserve price to the seller's own valuation. However, the maxmin reserve price may not be unique. If the number of bidders is sufficiently high, all prices below the seller's valuation, including zero, are also optimal. A second-price auction with the reserve equal to seller's value (or zero) is an asymptotically optimal mechanism (among all ex post individually rational mechanisms) as the number of bidders grows without bound.
