论文标题
董事会投票：使用低技术密码学在单个房间中使用投票隐私进行验证投票
Boardroom Voting: Verifiable Voting with Ballot Privacy Using Low-Tech Cryptography in a Single Room
论文作者
论文摘要
董事会选举是一次选举，该选举发生在一个房间 - 董事会 - 所有选民都可以看到和聆听的选举中。我们在不使用计算机标记或收集投票的情况下仅使用“低技术密码”对董事会选举的初步探索，该董事会选举仅使用“低技术密码”。具体来说，我们定义了问题，引入了几个构建块，并提出了一种新的协议，以新颖的方式结合了这些块。我们的新构件包括可以旋转的“可折叠选票”，以隐藏选票选择的对齐方式，以及易于记住和使用但很难描述的“视觉秘密”。尽管董事会选举中的紧密位置的参与者的隐私权有限，但该协议可确保没有人能确定其他人的投票方式。此外，每个选民都可以验证他们的投票是否正确进行，收集和计算，而无需证明他们的投票方式，从而提供了反对不当影响的保证。在成分不信任计算机技术的情况下，低技术密码学很有用，并且避免了端到端加密投票系统（如Prêt-à-voter）的复杂审计要求。本文的构件和协议旨在成为概念证明，可以测试可用性并提高。
A boardroom election is an election that takes place in a single room -- the boardroom -- in which all voters can see and hear each other. We present an initial exploration of boardroom elections with ballot privacy and voter verifiability that use only "low-tech cryptography" without using computers to mark or collect ballots. Specifically, we define the problem, introduce several building blocks, and propose a new protocol that combines these blocks in novel ways. Our new building blocks include "foldable ballots" that can be rotated to hide the alignment of ballot choices with voting marks, and "visual secrets" that are easy to remember and use but hard to describe. Although closely seated participants in a boardroom election have limited privacy, the protocol ensures that no one can determine how others voted. Moreover, each voter can verify that their ballot was correctly cast, collected, and counted, without being able to prove how they voted, providing assurance against undue influence. Low-tech cryptography is useful in situations where constituents do not trust computer technology, and it avoids the complex auditing requirements of end-to-end cryptographic voting systems such as Prêt-à-Voter. This paper's building blocks and protocol are meant to be a proof of concept that might be tested for usability and improved.
