论文标题
通过二进制输入离散无内存通道的秘密识别
Covert Identification over Binary-Input Discrete Memoryless Channels
论文作者
论文摘要
本文考虑了秘密的识别问题，即发件人的目标是通过二进制输入离散无内存通道（BDMC）可靠地向一组接收器传达标识（ID）消息，并同时确保通过另一个独立的BDMC来监视通信的看守者，以确保通信秘密。我们证明了针对秘密识别问题的方形法律。这指出可以通过n通道用途传输大小\ exp（\ exp（θ（\ sqrt {n}）））的ID消息。然后，我们表征θ（。）符号中的确切前恒定。该常数称为秘密识别能力。我们表明，它等于标准秘密通信问题最近开发的秘密容量，令人惊讶的是，可以实现秘密识别能力，而不会在发送者和接收器之间任何共享的密钥。可实现的证明依赖于带有脉冲位置调制（PPM）的随机编码参数，并与第二阶段一起执行代码改进。相反的证明依赖于消除参数以及具有严格输入约束的通道可分辨性。
This paper considers the covert identification problem in which a sender aims to reliably convey an identification (ID) message to a set of receivers via a binary-input discrete memoryless channel (BDMC), and simultaneously to guarantee that the communication is covert with respect to a warden who monitors the communication via another independent BDMC. We prove a square-root law for the covert identification problem. This states that an ID message of size \exp(\exp(Θ(\sqrt{n}))) can be transmitted over n channel uses. We then characterize the exact pre-constant in the Θ(.) notation. This constant is referred to as the covert identification capacity. We show that it equals the recently developed covert capacity in the standard covert communication problem, and somewhat surprisingly, the covert identification capacity can be achieved without any shared key between the sender and receivers. The achievability proof relies on a random coding argument with pulse-position modulation (PPM), coupled with a second stage which performs code refinements. The converse proof relies on an expurgation argument as well as results for channel resolvability with stringent input constraints.
