论文标题
用于多乘客乘车共享的预算平衡和防止策略的拍卖
Budget-balanced and strategy-proof auctions for multi-passenger ridesharing
论文作者
论文摘要
乘车和乘车服务已广泛，对乘车定价对于这些系统来说是一个至关重要的问题。我们建议和分析预算平衡和防止策略的拍卖，加权最小盈余（WMS）拍卖，对于每次乘客多个乘客的动态乘车问题。在向下封闭替代方案的假设下，我们获得了WMS拍卖中盈余福利和盈余利润的下限。我们还提出和分析了众所周知的VCG机制的预算均衡版本，即$ \ mathrm {vcg} _s $。 WMS拍卖和$ \ mathrm {vcg} _s $都获得了令人鼓舞的实验结果。
Ridesharing and ridesourcing services have become widespread, and pricing the rides is a crucial problem for these systems. We propose and analyze a budget-balanced and strategy-proof auction, the Weighted Minimum Surplus (WMS) auction, for the dynamic ridesharing problem with multiple passengers per ride. Under the assumption of downward closed alternatives, we obtain lower bounds for the surplus welfare and surplus profit of the WMS auction. We also propose and analyze a budget-balanced version of the well-known VCG mechanism, the $\mathrm{VCG}_s$. Encouraging experimental results were obtained for both the WMS auction and the $\mathrm{VCG}_s$.
