论文标题
违反机制的策略性抗抗性的公理分解
An Axiomatic Decomposition of Strategyproofness for Ordinal Mechanism with Indifferences
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了在弱偏好的完整领域中，该机制在有序的偏好列表中运行，即替代偏好的范围。我们将策略性型的新型分解为三个公理：分离单调，分离上部不变和分离下部不变。每个公理是对机制如何反应的自然限制，当代理改变对任何两个相邻排名替代组的相对排名的看法。我们的结果扩展了（Mennle and Seuken，2017年），这是对严格偏好的战略范围的分解，到包括弱偏好的完整领域。
We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We present a novel decomposition of strategyproofness into three axioms: separation monotonic, separation upper invariant, and separation lower invariant. Each axiom is a natural restriction on how mechanisms can react when agents change their opinion about the relative ranking of any two adjacently ranked groups of alternatives. Our result extends a result from (Mennle and Seuken, 2017), a decomposition of strategyproofness for strict preferences, to the full domain that includes weak preferences.
