论文标题
电动自动驾驶竞争竞争需求系统
Competition in Electric Autonomous Mobility on Demand Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
本文调查了自动驾驶在需求系统中的竞争的影响。通过采用基于网络流的配方，我们首先确定垄断和双向垄断市场中利润最大化平台运营商的最佳策略，包括游乐设施的最佳价格。此外，我们表征了平台运营商的利润和消费者盈余。我们表明，对于双头垄断，乘车的均衡价格必须在公司之间对称。然后，为了研究在市场中引入竞争的好处，我们在乘车价格，提供的总需求，公司的利润以及垄断和垄断环境之间的消费者盈余方面得出了普遍的理论界限。我们讨论消费者的忠诚度如何影响上述指标。最后，使用曼哈顿网络和需求数据，我们量化了静态定价和路由策略的功效，并将其与实时模型预测策略进行比较。
This paper investigates the impacts of competition in autonomous mobility-on-demand systems. By adopting a network-flow based formulation, we first determine the optimal strategies of profit-maximizing platform operators in monopoly and duopoly markets, including the optimal prices of rides. Furthermore, we characterize the platform operator's profits and the consumer surplus. We show that for the duopoly, the equilibrium prices for rides have to be symmetric between the firms. Then, in order to study the benefits of introducing competition in the market, we derive universal theoretical bounds on the ratio of prices for rides, aggregate demand served, profits of the firms, and consumer surplus between the monopolistic and the duopolistic setting. We discuss how consumers' firm loyalty affects each of the aforementioned metrics. Finally, using the Manhattan network and demand data, we quantify the efficacy of static pricing and routing policies and compare it to real-time model predictive policies.
