论文标题
在线公平部门的策略防护性，嫉妒性和帕累托效率与附加实用程序
Strategy-proofness, Envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency in Online Fair Division with Additive Utilities
论文作者
论文摘要
我们认为不可分割的物品以在线方式逐一到达，并立即分配给对这些物品具有附加实用程序的代理商。许多现有的离线机制在这种在线环境中不起作用。此外，许多现有的公理结果通常不会从离线转移到在线设置。因此，我们在这里提出了三种新的在线机制，并考虑了三种先前提出的在线机制的公理特性。在本文中，我们使用这些机制并表征了防策略机制的类别，并返回无嫉妒和无帕累托的有效分配以及这些属性的组合。最后，我们确定了一个重要的不可能结果。
We consider fair division problems where indivisible items arrive one-by-one in an online fashion and are allocated immediately to agents who have additive utilities over these items. Many existing offline mechanisms do not work in this online setting. In addition, many existing axiomatic results often do not transfer from the offline to the online setting. For this reason, we propose here three new online mechanisms, as well as consider the axiomatic properties of three previously proposed online mechanisms. In this paper, we use these mechanisms and characterize classes of online mechanisms that are strategy-proof, and return envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations, as well as combinations of these properties. Finally, we identify an important impossibility result.
