论文标题
Snitches会缝制：关于举报的困难
Snitches Get Stitches: On The Difficulty of Whistleblowing
论文作者
论文摘要
人类最关键的安全协议问题之一是，当您出卖信任时，也许是出于更高的目的，如果您被抓住，世界可能会反对您。在这篇简短的论文中，我们报告了使举报者能够更安全地向记者泄露敏感文件的努力。在对由于操作或技术问题发现举报者发现举报者的调查后，我们提出了一种游戏理论模型，以捕获举报人的功能动态。我们发现，举报人通常受到他人动机和能力的摆布。我们确定可以使用技术来减轻举报人的风险的特定领域。但是，我们警告说：主要的限制通常是制度的。
One of the most critical security protocol problems for humans is when you are betraying a trust, perhaps for some higher purpose, and the world can turn against you if you're caught. In this short paper, we report on efforts to enable whistleblowers to leak sensitive documents to journalists more safely. Following a survey of cases where whistleblowers were discovered due to operational or technological issues, we propose a game-theoretic model capturing the power dynamics involved in whistleblowing. We find that the whistleblower is often at the mercy of motivations and abilities of others. We identify specific areas where technology may be used to mitigate the whistleblower's risk. However we warn against technical solutionism: the main constraints are often institutional.
