论文标题
建模使用志愿者的困境游戏在紧急撤离中有助于行为
Modeling Helping Behavior in Emergency Evacuations Using Volunteer's Dilemma Game
论文作者
论文摘要
人们经常帮助遇到麻烦的其他人，尤其是在紧急撤离情况下。例如，在2005年的伦敦爆炸案中，据报道，撤离者帮助受伤的人逃避了危险的地方。就游戏理论而言，可以理解的是，这种帮助行为在昂贵的行为时提供了一种集体的好处，因为志愿者在紧急撤离时花费额外的时间来协助受伤的人。为了研究紧急撤离行为的集体影响，我们进行了数值模拟，以帮助在房间疏散情况下帮助撤离者之间的行为。我们的仿真模型基于志愿者的困境游戏，反映了志愿服务的成本。游戏理论模型与社会力量模型相结合，以了解疏散场景的空间和社会动态之间的关系。通过系统地改变帮助行为的成本参数，我们观察到了集体帮助行为的不同模式，并用相图总结了这些集体模式。
People often help others who are in trouble, especially in emergency evacuation situations. For instance, during the 2005 London bombings, it was reported that evacuees helped injured persons to escape the place of danger. In terms of game theory, it can be understood that such helping behavior provides a collective good while it is a costly behavior because the volunteers spend extra time to assist the injured persons in case of emergency evacuations. In order to study the collective effects of helping behavior in emergency evacuations, we have performed numerical simulations of helping behavior among evacuees in a room evacuation scenario. Our simulation model is based on the volunteer's dilemma game reflecting volunteering cost. The game theoretic model is coupled with a social force model to understand the relationship between the spatial and social dynamics of evacuation scenarios. By systematically changing the cost parameter of helping behavior, we observed different patterns of collective helping behaviors and these collective patterns are summarized with a phase diagram.
