论文标题
以最小的释放延迟来分享安全信息的成本共享信息
Cost Sharing Security Information with Minimal Release Delay
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了来自Bug Bounty计划的成本共享问题，在该计划中，代理商在享受成本共享信息的时间上获得了实用性。一旦将信息提供给代理，就无法撤回。目标不是最大化收入，而是尽早选择一段时间，以便足够的代理商愿意花费分享信息并在高级时间内享受信息，而其他代理商在一定的释放延迟后免费等待并免费享受信息。我们设计了一系列机制，目的是最大程度地减少最大延迟和总延迟。在没有先前的设置下，我们的最终机制在最大延迟方面达到了$ 4 $的竞争比率，而不是主导的机制。最后，我们假设代理商的估值分布，并根据预期的延迟研究机制的绩效。
We study a cost sharing problem derived from bug bounty programs, where agents gain utility by the amount of time they get to enjoy the cost shared information. Once the information is provided to an agent, it cannot be retracted. The goal, instead of maximizing revenue, is to pick a time as early as possible, so that enough agents are willing to cost share the information and enjoy it for a premium time period, while other agents wait and enjoy the information for free after a certain amount of release delay. We design a series of mechanisms with the goal of minimizing the maximum delay and the total delay. Under prior-free settings, our final mechanism achieves a competitive ratio of $4$ in terms of maximum delay, against an undominated mechanism. Finally, we assume some distributions of the agents' valuations, and investigate our mechanism's performance in terms of expected delays.
