论文标题
在法律过程中，通过随机选项定价诱导的工具游戏理论的机制
Mechanism of Instrumental Game Theory in The Legal Process via Stochastic Options Pricing Induction
论文作者
论文摘要
经济理论为理解法律，经济法，侵权法，合同法，程序法等方面的困惑意识形态提供了可估计的直觉。大多数法律制度要求参与法律纠纷的各方通过称为发现的过程交换信息。目的是减少双方之间不对称信息产生的相对乐观。就像在随机过程中的头部或尾巴现象一样，裁决的不确定性会影响当事方在法律谈判中的决定。因此，本文采用了待遇分析的原理来确定谈判如何在法律程序中失败，引入最佳交易成本的公理学概念，并基于向后感应和随机选择经济学制定数值方法，以估算合理且公平的讨价还价，以促进定居点，从而提高社会成本和降低的社交成本。
Economic theory has provided an estimable intuition in understanding the perplexing ideologies in law, in the areas of economic law, tort law, contract law, procedural law and many others. Most legal systems require the parties involved in a legal dispute to exchange information through a process called discovery. The purpose is to reduce the relative optimisms developed by asymmetric information between the parties. Like a head or tail phenomenon in stochastic processes, uncertainty in the adjudication affects the decisions of the parties in a legal negotiation. This paper therefore applies the principles of aleatory analysis to determine how negotiations fail in the legal process, introduce the axiological concept of optimal transaction cost and formulates a numerical methodology based on backwards induction and stochastic options pricing economics in estimating the reasonable and fair bargain in order to induce settlements thereby increasing efficiency and reducing social costs.
