论文标题
通过能源共享与融合证明的能源共享接近造物主的社会最佳
Approaching Prosumer Social Optimum via Energy Sharing with Proof of Convergence
论文作者
论文摘要
随着生产商的出现，由于计算负担，隐私问题和相互冲突的利益，传统的集中运营可能变得不切实际。在本文中，提出了一种能量共享机制，以适应生产者在能力限制的情况下的自我产生和需求的战略决策。在此设置下，Prosumers玩了一般的NASH游戏。我们证明了游戏的主要特性：存在平衡，部分是独一无二的；能源共享的情况下，没有生产者会更糟，而行政管理的价格为1-O（1/i），而我是生产商的数量。特别是，POA倾向于越来越多的生产者，这意味着在拟议的能源共享方法下，由此产生的总成本社会最佳。我们证明，相应的生产者的策略也融合了社会最佳解决方案。最后，我们提出了一个招标过程，并证明它在轻度条件下会收敛到能量共享平衡。提供了说明性示例以验证结果。
With the advent of prosumers, the traditional centralized operation may become impracticable due to computational burden, privacy concerns, and conflicting interests. In this paper, an energy sharing mechanism is proposed to accommodate prosumers' strategic decision-making on their self-production and demand in the presence of capacity constraints. Under this setting, prosumers play a generalized Nash game. We prove main properties of the game: an equilibrium exists and is partially unique; no prosumer is worse off by energy sharing and the price-of-anarchy is 1-O(1/I) where I is the number of prosumers. In particular, the PoA tends to 1 with a growing number of prosumers, meaning that the resulting total cost under the proposed energy sharing approaches social optimum. We prove that the corresponding prosumers' strategies converge to the social optimal solution as well. Finally we propose a bidding process and prove that it converges to the energy sharing equilibrium under mild conditions. Illustrative examples are provided to validate the results.
