论文标题
电晕游戏：面具，社会距离和机制设计
Corona Games: Masks, Social Distancing and Mechanism Design
论文作者
论文摘要
大流行反应是一件复杂的事情。大多数政府采取了一套准标准措施来对抗共同的19日，包括戴口罩，社交距离，病毒测试和接触跟踪。我们认为，这些措施有效性不同的一些非平凡因素是自私的决策和反应机制的不同国家实施。在本文中，通过简单的游戏，我们展示了个人激励措施对戴口罩和社交距离做出的决定的影响，以及这些如何导致次级最佳结果。我们还展示了国家当局在正确设计这些游戏的责任，这些游戏适当地涉及所选政策及其对首选结果的影响。我们促进了一种机制设计方法：在实施各自的大流行应对机制时，仔细平衡社会利益和应对成本符合每个政府的最大利益。
Pandemic response is a complex affair. Most governments employ a set of quasi-standard measures to fight COVID-19 including wearing masks, social distancing, virus testing and contact tracing. We argue that some non-trivial factors behind the varying effectiveness of these measures are selfish decision-making and the differing national implementations of the response mechanism. In this paper, through simple games, we show the effect of individual incentives on the decisions made with respect to wearing masks and social distancing, and how these may result in a sub-optimal outcome. We also demonstrate the responsibility of national authorities in designing these games properly regarding the chosen policies and their influence on the preferred outcome. We promote a mechanism design approach: it is in the best interest of every government to carefully balance social good and response costs when implementing their respective pandemic response mechanism.
