论文标题
防sybil-Prover Answer查询机制
Sybil-proof Answer Querying Mechanism
论文作者
论文摘要
我们在社交网络上研究一个问题回答问题，请求者正在寻求网络上的代理商的答案。目的是设计奖励机制，以激励代理商在没有答案的情况下向邻居传播请求者的查询。现有的机制容易受到Sybil-攻击的影响，即代理商可能通过创建假身份而获得更多的回报。因此，我们首先证明解决Sybil-攻击，然后表征满足Sybil-Profform-Proform-Proformentness（防止Sybil-Attacks）以及其他期望的特性的一类机制来解决这个问题。除了防SYBIL-PORNOVENS，我们还考虑了请求者和代理商碰撞的成本降至最低。
We study a question answering problem on a social network, where a requester is seeking an answer from the agents on the network. The goal is to design reward mechanisms to incentivize the agents to propagate the requester's query to their neighbours if they don't have the answer. Existing mechanisms are vulnerable to Sybil-attacks, i.e., an agent may get more reward by creating fake identities. Hence, we combat this problem by first proving some impossibility results to resolve Sybil-attacks and then characterizing a class of mechanisms which satisfy Sybil-proofness (prevents Sybil-attacks) as well as other desirable properties. Except for Sybil-proofness, we also consider cost minimization for the requester and agents' collusions.
