论文标题

基于闩锁的逻辑锁定

Latch-Based Logic Locking

论文作者

Sweeney, Joseph, Zackriya V, Mohammed, Pagliarini, Samuel, Pileggi, Lawrence

论文摘要

IC制造的全球化导致了安全问题的增加,特别是IP盗用。已经开发了几种用于保护设计的逻辑锁定技术,但是它们通常显示出很大的开销,并且通常容易受到破译的攻击。在本文中,我们提出了基于闩锁的逻辑锁定,该逻辑锁定在设计中操纵数据流和逻辑。此方法将现有触发器的互连子集转换为具有可编程阶段的闩锁对。在同时,添加了诱饵闩锁和逻辑,从而抑制攻击者确定实际的设计功能。为了验证这项技术,我们开发并验证了锁定插入流,分析了基准电路和行业核心上的PPA和ATPG开销,扩展了现有的攻击以说明该技术,并录制了示范芯片。重要的是,我们证明,使用这种方法的设计开销要比以前的逻辑锁定方案少得多,同时抵制了基于模型检查器的Oracle驱动攻击。随着开销的最小延迟,可以添加大量的诱饵闩锁,廉价地增加了抗攻击性。

Globalization of IC manufacturing has led to increased security concerns, notably IP theft. Several logic locking techniques have been developed for protecting designs, but they typically display very large overhead, and are generally susceptible to deciphering attacks. In this paper, we propose latch-based logic locking, which manipulates both the flow of data and logic in the design. This method converts an interconnected subset of existing flip-flops to pairs of latches with programmable phase. In tandem, decoy latches and logic are added, inhibiting an attacker from determining the actual design functionality. To validate this technique, we developed and verified a locking insertion flow, analyzed PPA and ATPG overhead on benchmark circuits and industry cores, extended existing attacks to account for the technique, and taped out a demonstration chip. Importantly, we show that the design overhead with this approach is significantly less than with previous logic locking schemes, while resisting model checker-based, oracle-driven attacks. With minimal delay overhead, large numbers of decoy latches can be added, cheaply increasing attack resistance.

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