论文标题
随机数生成器攻击针对Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise安全钥匙交换协议
Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchange Protocol
论文作者
论文摘要
本文介绍并展示了针对Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise（KLJN）安全密钥交换计划的两次新攻击。攻击基于具有损害安全性的随机数生成器。首先，我们探讨了夏娃知道爱丽丝和鲍勃随机数生成器的种子的情况。我们表明，在这种情况下，即使她的当前和电压测量值只有一点点分辨率，前夕也可以在位交换周期的一小部分内破解安全密钥位。在第二次攻击中，我们探讨了夏娃只知道爱丽丝随机数发生器的种子的情况。我们表明，在这种情况下，前夕仍然可以破解安全的密钥位，但她需要将整个位交换期用于攻击。 KLJN密钥交换方案的安全性与其他协议类似，因此必须将随机数生成器输出对于EVE来说是真正的随机输出。
This paper introduces and demonstrates two new attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks are based on random number generators with compromised security. First we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of both Alice's and Bob's random number generators. We show that in this situation Eve can crack the secure key bit within a fraction of the bit exchange period even if her current and voltage measurements have only a single bit of resolution. In the second attack, we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of only Alice's random number generator. We show that in this situation Eve can still crack the secure key bit but she needs to use the whole bit exchange period for the attack. The security of the KLJN key exchange scheme, similarly to other protocols, necessitates that the random number generator outputs are truly random for Eve.
