论文标题
理性共识
Rational Consensus
论文作者
论文摘要
假设流程是由理性代理控制的，并且可能因崩溃而失败，我们提供了对共识的游戏理论分析。我们认为\ emph {仅关心共识}的代理：也就是说，（a）代理商的效用仅取决于达成的共识值（例如，例如，代理商发送的消息数）和（b）严格偏爱达成共识而不是达成共识。我们表明，在这些假设下，即使只有一个失败，也没有\ emph {ex post nash均衡}。粗略地说，这意味着必须始终存在\ emph {失败模式}（对谁失败，失败以及哪些代理人在回合中未发送消息的描述）和代理可以通过偏差获得的初始偏好。另一方面，如果我们假设故障模式和初始偏好有分布$π$，那么在$π$上的最小假设下，纳什平衡可以容忍$ f $失败（即，$π$ puts puts概率1在最多$ f $ flafores上），如果$ f+1 <n $ n $ n $ n $ n $ n $ n $是数字的数字，则是数字的数字。此外，我们表明NASH平衡策略的轻微扩展也是\ Emph {sequention}平衡（在相同的关于分布$π$的假设下）。
We provide a game-theoretic analysis of consensus, assuming that processes are controlled by rational agents and may fail by crashing. We consider agents that \emph{care only about consensus}: that is, (a) an agent's utility depends only on the consensus value achieved (and not, for example, on the number of messages the agent sends) and (b) agents strictly prefer reaching consensus to not reaching consensus. We show that, under these assumptions, there is no \emph{ex post Nash Equilibrium}, even with only one failure. Roughly speaking, this means that there must always exist a \emph{failure pattern} (a description of who fails, when they fail, and which agents they do not send messages to in the round that they fail) and initial preferences for which an agent can gain by deviating. On the other hand, if we assume that there is a distribution $π$ on the failure patterns and initial preferences, then under minimal assumptions on $π$, there is a Nash equilibrium that tolerates $f$ failures (i.e., $π$ puts probability 1 on there being at most $f$ failures) if $f+1 < n$ (where $n$ is the total number of agents). Moreover, we show that a slight extension of the Nash equilibrium strategy is also a \emph{sequential} equilibrium (under the same assumptions about the distribution $π$).
