论文标题
在匹配市场中的动态储备
Dynamic Reserves in Matching Markets
论文作者
论文摘要
我们在平权行动政策下研究了学校选择问题，当局为特定学生团体保留一定数一小部分的老虎机，而学生不仅有匹配与他们所匹配的学校的偏好，还具有他们所收到的老虎机的偏好。在某些学生群体需求较低的情况下，此类保留政策可能会导致浪费。为了提出解决这个问题的解决方案，我们构建了一个选择功能的家族，动态储量选择功能，尊重集团内公平性并允许将原本空缺的插槽从低需求组转移到高需求组的学校。我们将累积的要约机制（COM）作为分配规则，在该规则中，每所学校都使用动态储备选择功能，并表明它在学校的选择功能方面是稳定的，是防策略的，并且尊重改进。此外，我们表明，转移更多原本空缺的插槽会导致COM下的策略帕累托改进。
We study a school choice problem under affirmative action policies where authorities reserve a certain fraction of the slots at each school for specific student groups, and where students have preferences not only over the schools they are matched to but also the type of slots they receive. Such reservation policies might cause waste in instances of low demand from some student groups. To propose a solution to this issue, we construct a family of choice functions, dynamic reserves choice functions, for schools that respect within-group fairness and allow the transfer of otherwise vacant slots from low-demand groups to high-demand groups. We propose the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) as an allocation rule where each school uses a dynamic reserves choice function and show that it is stable with respect to schools' choice functions, is strategy-proof, and respects improvements. Furthermore, we show that transferring more of the otherwise vacant slots leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement under the COM.
