论文标题
功率 - 供应台：通过将功率供应转换为扬声器，从空地系统中泄漏数据
POWER-SUPPLaY: Leaking Data from Air-Gapped Systems by Turning the Power-Supplies Into Speakers
论文作者
论文摘要
众所周知，攻击者可以通过声音和超声波通过扬声器从气动计算机中渗透数据。为了消除敏感系统中这种声学秘密通道的威胁，可以禁用音频硬件，并且可以严格禁止使用扬声器。这样的无音频系统被认为是\ textit {音频范围}，因此免疫原声秘密通道。 在本文中，我们引入了一种技术，该技术使攻击者从气动和音频系统中听到大声泄漏数据。我们开发的恶意软件可以利用计算机电源单元（PSU）播放声音，并将其用作功能有限的频带外，次级扬声器。恶意代码操纵电源的内部\ textit {开关频率}，因此控制了从其电容器和变压器产生的声波形。我们的技术使以0-24kHz的频带制作音频音调，并从计算机电源中播放音频流（例如WAV），而无需音频硬件或扬声器。二进制数据（文件，键盘，加密密钥等）可以在声学信号上调制并发送到附近的接收器（例如智能手机）。我们表明，我们的技术与各种类型的系统一起使用：PC工作站和服务器，以及根本没有音频硬件的嵌入式系统和IoT设备。我们提供技术背景并讨论实现细节，例如信号生成和数据调制。我们表明，功率 - 供应代码可以从普通的用户模式流程运行，并且不需要任何硬件访问或特殊特权。我们的评估表明，使用功率供应式数据，可以从5米的距离远距离从空地和音频的系统中淘汰敏感数据，最大比特速率为50位/秒。
It is known that attackers can exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers through their speakers via sonic and ultrasonic waves. To eliminate the threat of such acoustic covert channels in sensitive systems, audio hardware can be disabled and the use of loudspeakers can be strictly forbidden. Such audio-less systems are considered to be \textit{audio-gapped}, and hence immune to acoustic covert channels. In this paper, we introduce a technique that enable attackers leak data acoustically from air-gapped and audio-gapped systems. Our developed malware can exploit the computer power supply unit (PSU) to play sounds and use it as an out-of-band, secondary speaker with limited capabilities. The malicious code manipulates the internal \textit{switching frequency} of the power supply and hence controls the sound waveforms generated from its capacitors and transformers. Our technique enables producing audio tones in a frequency band of 0-24khz and playing audio streams (e.g., WAV) from a computer power supply without the need for audio hardware or speakers. Binary data (files, keylogging, encryption keys, etc.) can be modulated over the acoustic signals and sent to a nearby receiver (e.g., smartphone). We show that our technique works with various types of systems: PC workstations and servers, as well as embedded systems and IoT devices that have no audio hardware at all. We provide technical background and discuss implementation details such as signal generation and data modulation. We show that the POWER-SUPPLaY code can operate from an ordinary user-mode process and doesn't need any hardware access or special privileges. Our evaluation shows that using POWER-SUPPLaY, sensitive data can be exfiltrated from air-gapped and audio-gapped systems from a distance of five meters away at a maximal bit rates of 50 bit/sec.
