论文标题
意图作为时间的承诺
Intention as Commitment toward Time
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们解决了动态环境中的意图，时间和信念之间的相互作用。第一个贡献是关于意图，时间和信念的推理的逻辑，其中意图的假设由预期行动的前提代表。只要没有违反这些假设，即只要可以执行预期的行动以使其前提条件也能够成立，意图和信念是连贯的。第二个贡献是对情况的形式化：如果采用了新的（可能相互矛盾的）意图，或者学习了新事实，意图和信念会发生什么？只要其信仰意图数据库连贯，代理人就致力于其预期的行动。我们将意图概念化为对时间的承诺，并为信念意识数据库的迭代修订开发了基于AGM的假设，并且我们证明了Katsuno-Mendelzon-Style代表定理。
In this paper we address the interplay among intention, time, and belief in dynamic environments. The first contribution is a logic for reasoning about intention, time and belief, in which assumptions of intentions are represented by preconditions of intended actions. Intentions and beliefs are coherent as long as these assumptions are not violated, i.e. as long as intended actions can be performed such that their preconditions hold as well. The second contribution is the formalization of what-if scenarios: what happens with intentions and beliefs if a new (possibly conflicting) intention is adopted, or a new fact is learned? An agent is committed to its intended actions as long as its belief-intention database is coherent. We conceptualize intention as commitment toward time and we develop AGM-based postulates for the iterated revision of belief-intention databases, and we prove a Katsuno-Mendelzon-style representation theorem.
