论文标题
共同概念：朝着正式定义（并记录在案）的隐私目标中，并声称在接近度追踪服务中得到保护
Covid Notions: Towards Formal Definitions -- and Documented Understanding -- of Privacy Goals and Claimed Protection in Proximity-Tracing Services
论文作者
论文摘要
最近的SARS-COV-2大流行通过移动应用程序进行接触跟踪引起了管理方法。相应的应用程序跟踪个人及其相互作用，以促进在传染性之前先向用户发出潜在的感染。幼稚的实施显然危害了其用户的健康状况，位置，活动和社交互动的隐私。已经开发了许多用于托管跟踪的协议设计，其中大多数声称以隐私的方式运行。但是，尽管诸如“ GDPR合规”，“匿名性”，“化名”或其他形式的“隐私”之类的主张，这些设计的作者通常会忽略以精确定义其（旨在）保护的内容。我们朝着正式定义接近跟踪服务的隐私概念迈出了第一步，尤其是在健康，（共同）位置和用户的社交互动方面。我们还提供了最重要的建议可以也无法实现的高级直觉。此初始概述表明所有建议都包括一些集中式服务，并且没有一个完美地保护感染用户的身份和（共同）位置，使其不受其他用户和服务提供商的影响。
The recent SARS-CoV-2 pandemic gave rise to management approaches using mobile apps for contact tracing. The corresponding apps track individuals and their interactions, to facilitate alerting users of potential infections well before they become infectious themselves. Naive implementation obviously jeopardizes the privacy of health conditions, location, activities, and social interaction of its users. A number of protocol designs for colocation tracking have already been developed, most of which claim to function in a privacy preserving manner. However, despite claims such as "GDPR compliance", "anonymity", "pseudonymity" or other forms of "privacy", the authors of these designs usually neglect to precisely define what they (aim to) protect. We make a first step towards formally defining the privacy notions of proximity tracing services, especially with regards to the health, (co-)location, and social interaction of their users. We also give a high-level intuition of which protection the most prominent proposals can and cannot achieve. This initial overview indicates that all proposals include some centralized services, and none protects identity and (co-)locations of infected users perfectly from both other users and the service provider.
