论文标题
与异质司机交通的社会困境
Social dilemma in traffic with heterogeneous drivers
论文作者
论文摘要
与公地的悲剧相似，这可能是由超车造成的。我们分析了Nagel和Schreckenberg提出的最小车辆交通模型中超过车辆的效果，其中包括两种类型的驾驶员：超过的驾驶员和没有的驾驶员。我们表明，在某些情况下，超车是好的，因为它增加了道路容量，并最大程度地减少了驾驶员在道路上花费的时间。但是，当不满足这些条件时，超车对所有人有害。更具体地说，我们发现，如果随机减速的可能性很低，则在过渡到拥挤流量的附近出现了社会困境，这在更现实的单车道模型中也可能发生。造成社会困境的基本机制是，当超车汽车返回车道时，突然减速。我们分析了收益如何取决于人口中的策略频率，以结论超过的驾驶员是叛逃者，而不是合作者的驾驶员，类似于下议院游戏阶级的策略。
There is a tragedy of the traffic analogous to the tragedy of the commons that can be caused by overtaking. We analyze the effect of overtaking in a minimal model of vehicular traffic, the model proposed by Nagel and Schreckenberg, with two types of drivers: drivers that overtake and drivers that do not. We show that, under certain circumstances, overtaking is good because it increases the road capacity and minimizes the mean time spent by the driver on the road. However, when these conditions are not met, overtaking is harmful to all. More specifically, we found that a social dilemma emerges in the vicinity of the transition to the congested traffic if the probability of random deceleration is low, which can also happen in more realistic single-lane models. The essential mechanism creating the social dilemma is the abrupt deceleration when the overtaking car returns to its lane. We analyze how the payoffs depend on the frequency of strategies in the population to conclude that the drivers that overtake are defectors and the ones that do not are cooperators, analogous to the strategies in tragedy of the commons class of games.
