论文标题
激励动态系统中战略传感器的真实报道
Incentivizing Truthful Reporting from Strategic Sensors in Dynamical Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
在动态系统的背景下，人类代理人越来越多地用作数据源。与传统传感器不同，人类可能会出于自私的原因操纵或忽略数据。因此，本文研究了规避努力的战略传感器对离散时间LTI系统的影响。在我们的环境中，传感器付出了昂贵的努力来收集数据，并向系统操作员报告他们的精力。但是，传感器不会直接从系统的输出中受益，因此他们不会付出太多的努力来确保准确性，甚至可以伪造他们报告的努力以最大程度地提高其效用。我们探索了激励战略传感器的真实报告的付款机制。我们证明了真实和报告的努力对预期运营成本的影响。然后，我们使用系统成本的实现来构建付款功能。我们表明，通常在静态设置中使用的付款功能将无法引起一般的真实报告，并提出了一种修改的付款功能，该功能引起了真实的报告，该报告需要弥补报告工作对系统闭环性能的动态影响的术语。
Human agents are increasingly serving as data sources in the context of dynamical systems. Unlike traditional sensors, humans may manipulate or omit data for selfish reasons. Therefore, this paper studies the influence of effort-averse strategic sensors on discrete-time LTI systems. In our setting, sensors exert costly effort to collect data, and report their effort to the system operator. However, sensors do not directly benefit from the output of the system, so they will not exert much effort to ensure accuracy and may even falsify their reported effort to maximize their utility. We explore payment mechanisms that incentivize truthful reporting from strategic sensors. We demonstrate the influence of the true and reported effort on the expected operational cost. Then, we use the realizations of the system cost to construct a payment function. We show that payment functions typically used in static settings will not be able to elicit truthful reports in general, and present a modified payment function that elicits truthful reporting, which requires terms that compensate for the dynamic impact of reported efforts on the closed-loop performance of the system.
