论文标题
数据市场中的均衡选择：非竞争商品的多主要，多代理问题
Equilibrium Selection in Data Markets: Multiple-Principal, Multiple-Agent Problems with Non-Rivalrous Goods
论文作者
论文摘要
数据市场的几个方面将它们与典型的商品市场区分开：非对称信息，数据的非竞争性质和信息外部性。正式地，这引起了新的游戏类别，我们将其称为多主要，多代理产品的问题。假设委托人的收益是对代理商的付款中的准线性，我们表明非矛盾商品市场存在基本的变性。这种平衡的多样性还影响了旨在独特选择平衡的平衡定义的共同改进：变化平衡和归一化均衡通常是非唯一的。这意味着大多数现有的平衡概念无法对当今出现的数据市场的结果提供预测。结果支持这样的想法：对付款合同本身的修改不太可能产生独特的均衡，并且需要对研究模型进行更改，或者需要新的平衡概念来确定具有多个原理和非竞争利益的设置中的独特平衡。
There are several aspects of data markets that distinguish them from a typical commodity market: asymmetric information, the non-rivalrous nature of data, and informational externalities. Formally, this gives rise to a new class of games which we call multiple-principal, multiple-agent problem with non-rivalrous goods. Under the assumption that the principal's payoff is quasilinear in the payments given to agents, we show that there is a fundamental degeneracy in the market of non-rivalrous goods. This multiplicity of equilibria also affects common refinements of equilibrium definitions intended to uniquely select an equilibrium: both variational equilibria and normalized equilibria will be non-unique in general. This implies that most existing equilibrium concepts cannot provide predictions on the outcomes of data markets emerging today. The results support the idea that modifications to payment contracts themselves are unlikely to yield a unique equilibrium, and either changes to the models of study or new equilibrium concepts will be required to determine unique equilibria in settings with multiple principals and a non-rivalrous good.
