论文标题
保持听众的参与：贝叶斯说服的动态模型
Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了贝叶斯说服的动态模型，在该模型中，信息需要时间，并且要使发件人生成和接收者处理的代价高昂，并且任何玩家都无法对他们的未来行动进行。说服力可能会完全崩溃在马尔可夫的完美平衡（MPE）中。但是，对于说服力的成本足够小，民间定理的一种版本：结果是，近似Kamenica和Gentzkow（2011）的发件人 - 最佳说服力以及完全启示的结果，介于两者之间的所有内容都是在MPE中获得的，因为成本消失了。
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)'s sender-optimal persuasion as well as full revelation and everything in between are obtained in MPE, as the cost vanishes.
