论文标题
自私的徒劳 - 自私路由对不协调和优化的运输网络的影响
The Futility of Being Selfish -- The Impact of Selfish Routing on Uncoordinated and Optimized Transportation Networks
论文作者
论文摘要
优化流量流对于缓解拥塞至关重要。但是，即使提供了全球最佳，协调和个性化的路线，用户也可以选择提供较低个人成本的替代路线。通过分析使用腔体方法的自私路线选择对性能的影响，我们发现较小的自私路线选择比例可以提高不协调的运输网络的全球性能，但会降低优化系统的效率。值得注意的是，在某些参数条件下，兼容的用户总是会在前者中获得后者的收益。理论结果与大规模模拟非常吻合。一小部分自私使用者的迭代路线交换导致NASH Equilibria接近全球最佳路由解决方案。我们的理论框架还概括了最初用于研究平衡状态的腔体方法的使用，以分析迭代游戏理论问题。当并非所有车辆都遵循协调路线时，这些结果阐明了通过路线协调缓解交通拥堵的可行性。
Optimizing traffic flow is essential for easing congestion. However, even when globally-optimal, coordinated and individualized routes are provided, users may choose alternative routes which offer lower individual costs. By analyzing the impact of selfish route-choices on performance using the cavity method, we find that a small ratio of selfish route-choices improves the global performance of uncoordinated transportation networks, but degrades the efficiency of optimized systems. Remarkably, compliant users always gain in the former and selfish users may gain in the latter, under some parameter conditions. The theoretical results are in good agreement with large-scale simulations. Iterative route-switching by a small fraction of selfish users leads to Nash equilibria close to the globally optimal routing solution. Our theoretical framework also generalizes the use of the cavity method, originally developed for the study of equilibrium states, to analyze iterative game-theoretical problems. These results shed light on the feasibility of easing congestion by route coordination when not all vehicles follow the coordinated routes.
