论文标题
用供应链导向市场变暖的价格
A price on warming with a supply chain directed market
论文作者
论文摘要
现有的排放贸易系统（ETS）设计抑制排放量，但不会将变暖限制为任何FXED水平，从而阻止了全球变暖路径的确定性。相反，它们具有减少排放的间接目标。他们提供了不良的未来价格信息。他们的实施成本很高，需要条约和法律。为了解决这些缺点，本文提出了一种新型的排放允许允许和隔离合同的双向拍卖机制。这种机制限制了未来的许多（例如150年）的变暖，每次拍卖都将为这个时间范围提供价格信息。此外，本文提出了一套市场规则和自下而上的实施路径。企业联盟开始实施，随着辖区的准备就绪。所选市场规则和拟议的实施路径的结合似乎激励参与。这种设计似乎比文献中的缓解成本更接近“第一最好”，同时增加了避免灾难性变暖的确定性。该设计还应具有更快的实现途径。数值模拟显示出令人惊讶的结果，例如，静态价格是错误的，价格应随着时间的流逝而与其他最近的建议相矛盾，并且现有ETS中使用的“全球变暖潜力”通常是错误的。
Existing emissions trading system (ETS) designs inhibit emissions but do not constrain warming to any fxed level, preventing certainty of the global path of warming. Instead, they have the indirect objective of reducing emissions. They provide poor future price information. And they have high transaction costs for implementation, requiring treaties and laws. To address these shortcomings, this paper proposes a novel double-sided auction mechanism of emissions permits and sequestration contracts tied to temperature. This mechanism constrains warming for many (e.g., 150) years into the future and every auction would provide price information for this time range. In addition, this paper proposes a set of market rules and a bottom-up implementation path. A coalition of businesses begin implementation with jurisdictions joining as they are ready. The combination of the selected market rules and the proposed implementation path appear to incentivize participation. This design appears to be closer to "first best" with a lower cost of mitigation than any in the literature, while increasing the certainty of avoiding catastrophic warming. This design should also have a faster pathway to implementation. A numerical simulation shows surprising results, e.g., that static prices are wrong, prices should evolve over time in a way that contradicts other recent proposals, and "global warming potential" as used in existing ETSs are generally erroneous.
