论文标题
亮度：通过屏幕亮度从空地工作站泄漏敏感数据
BRIGHTNESS: Leaking Sensitive Data from Air-Gapped Workstations via Screen Brightness
论文作者
论文摘要
空调计算机是由于它们存储或流程敏感信息而与互联网隔离的系统。 在本文中，我们介绍了一个光学秘密通道，在该通道中，攻击者可以通过屏幕亮度上的操纵来泄漏（或剥落）敏感信息（或剥离）敏感信息。该秘密频道是看不见的，即使用户在计算机上工作时，它也有效。折衷计算机上的恶意软件可以获取敏感数据（例如，文件，图像，加密密钥和密码），并在屏幕亮度中对用户看不见的屏幕亮度进行调节。亮度的小变化是人类看不见的，但可以从诸如本地安全摄像头，智能手机相机或网络摄像头等摄像机拍摄的视频流中恢复。我们介绍相关的工作，并讨论此秘密渠道的技术和科学背景。我们在各种参数，不同类型的计算机和电视屏幕以及几个距离的情况下检查了频道的边界。我们还测试了不同类型的相机接收器，以演示秘密通道。最后，我们提供了与此类攻击相关的对策。最后，我们提供了与此类攻击相关的对策。
Air-gapped computers are systems that are kept isolated from the Internet since they store or process sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce an optical covert channel in which an attacker can leak (or, exfiltlrate) sensitive information from air-gapped computers through manipulations on the screen brightness. This covert channel is invisible and it works even while the user is working on the computer. Malware on a compromised computer can obtain sensitive data (e.g., files, images, encryption keys and passwords), and modulate it within the screen brightness, invisible to users. The small changes in the brightness are invisible to humans but can be recovered from video streams taken by cameras such as a local security camera, smartphone camera or a webcam. We present related work and discuss the technical and scientific background of this covert channel. We examined the channel's boundaries under various parameters, with different types of computer and TV screens, and at several distances. We also tested different types of camera receivers to demonstrate the covert channel. Lastly, we present relevant countermeasures to this type of attack. Lastly, we present relevant countermeasures to this type of attack.
